BOOSTING AIR DEFENCE CAPABILITIES
Second, both sides must address the insufficiency of the Philippines’ integrated air and missile defence (IAMD) networks, which are necessary to offset the risks of hosting US forces.
The Philippine government’s acquisition of short-range SPYDER air defence batteries since 2022 is notable, but the country still lacks fundamentals, such as sufficient quantities of air defence batteries, modern fighter jets, interceptors and medium-range IAMD. The Army Artillery Regiment’s Shore-Based Missile System programme is in its infancy, while the Multi-Role Fighter project has languished.
In the event of a military conflict, the limited air defences of the Philippines will likely be forced to prioritise defending bases or precision strike capabilities, such as BrahMos anti-ship missile batteries, rather than protect civilian population centres.
The lack of explicit and substantial integration of IAMD into EDCA planning is noticeable. The 12th US-Philippine Bilateral Strategic Dialogue in February affirmed that both countries will “continue and work to increase deployments of US cutting-edge missile and unmanned systems to the Philippines”. However, US air defence systems such as Patriot missile defences, Terminal High Altitude Area Defence (THAAD) interceptors and the Aegis Combat System are absent in public statements from Manila and Washington.
Instead, the alliance has primarily focused on anti-ship capabilities with the indefinite deployment of the US’ Typhon mid-range capability missile system and the Navy-Marine Expeditionary Ship Interdiction System (NMESIS) in 2025, which reflect an outdated threat assessment focusing on maritime disputes between Beijing and Manila.
The ongoing Middle East conflict and shortages of interceptors and missile defences highlight the limits of the US security umbrella in Asia.
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