Adam Smith, though better known now as an economist held the chair of Moral Philosophy at Glasgow and as such it’s fair to assume that he knew a thing or two about the intersection of economics, philosophy and politics, and that often a political crisis is motivated by an underlying economic crisis.
Smith lived during a time of mercantilism, which we might describe as a nationalistic approach to trade that aims to maximise the exports of a country whilst keeping imports to a minimum. In this context, Smith wrote of mercantilist nations that ‘their interest lies in beggaring their neighbours’, and the phrase ‘beggar thy neighbour’ has been often used in the economic context, usually when growth is scarce (the aftermath of the Great Depression and the Global Financial crisis)
With mercantilism and ‘beggar thy neighbour’ back in fashion, it is worth returning to Smith’s ‘Wealth of Nations, book IV’ where many of the observations Smith made chime with America today, such as:
‘The sneaking arts of underling tradesmen are thus erected into political maxims for the conduct of a great empire … . By such maxims as these, however, nations have been taught that their interest consisted in beggaring all their neighbours. Each nation has been made to look with an invidious eye upon the prosperity of all the nations with which it trades, and to consider their gain as its own loss. Commerce, which ought naturally to be, among nations, as among individuals, a bond of union and friendship, has become the most fertile source of discord and animosity’.
To that end, beyond the bonfire of American values and diplomatic relationships, there is an emerging, underlying logic to the policies of the White House that China, Japan and Europe need to pay attention to.
I have written many times in this note that the world economy is in the antechamber of a fiscal-debt crisis (listen to ‘Waking up to World Debt’). Unusually, all of the major economies have become indebted at the same time, and the process(es) by which they try to reduce debt at the same time will likely prove extremely hazardous financially.
It seems that the Trump entourage understands this, and that logically the unifying factor behind disparate policies from the creation of ‘DOGE’ to the enfeebling of NATO are driven by a brutal sense of austerity, that starts with the cutting down of all the international public goods that the US has invested in since Bretton Woods.
In this context, the ‘beggaring’ of Europe pushes the bill for European security back across the Atlantic and has shaped the debate in Europe towards greater debt accumulation (for example the debt brake is one of the most contentious topics for the new German government and the EU will soon embark on the issue of EU defence bonds). Japan, South Korea and Australia might be next.
In effect, the White House is using areas where America is exceptional – financial markets, the military and multinationals – to coerce its allies. Debt might be next.
The closest we have to a template for a Trump grand macro plan is a paper written by Stephen Miran, who may soon take up the role of head of the Council for Economic Advisers. The elements in this plan have popularly become known as the ‘Mar-A-Lago Accord’, which is not unlike the world debt conference idea I have written about in The Levelling, though my version takes place in the recently refurbished Raffles (Singapore).
One of the pillars of the cited ‘Mar-A-Lago Accord is that holders of Treasuries exchange these securities for very long-term loans (that might not provide a coupon). The result would be to restructure the maturity and fiscal burden of America’s debt load. It is a neat idea but will not work in practice. Any debt accord will likely need the impetus of a major financial crisis as a motivator, will need to restructure the debt of all the major economies and will entail a rewriting of financial regulations across the world (for pension funds for example).
In reality, an attempt to enact a Mar-a-Lago Accord, in the same fashion as the debate around NATO, may create aversion (distrust in) to US financial assets and the dollar. Whilst Europeans may not appreciate the extent to which a ‘beggar thy neighbour’ philosophy is driven by US security policy, the White House is underestimating the value that America’s wide ranging financial, diplomatic and commercial infrastructure bring it. An example is that close to 40% of the revenues of large American firms come from overseas.
In the short-term, we are also starting to witness the effects of austerity on the American economy. Though ‘hard’ data on the economy remain solid, the outlook will become very noisy in the next few months as government job cuts take hold and as social welfare cuts (notably in the mortgage industry) sow anxiety. Markets have started to become jittery too, amidst a belief that the administration is much more focused on lowering bond yields (and thus the cost of government debt) than boosting the stock market.
In a scenario where the (US) economy weakens, investors normally turn to Treasuries, but the prospect of a Mar-A-Lago Accord being foisted upon them could lead to a buyers’ strike.
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