On the surface, this decision doesn’t seem to make sense. Mr Chen’s strength lies in ideological and ethnic governance, precisely the areas the Party now prioritises in Xinjiang. Since the early 2000s, Beijing has expressed continued concerns of “terrorism” and “separatism” in the region.
Mr Chen also appears to have backing at the highest of levels. In September, Mr Xi visited the region for its 70th anniversary – a powerful endorsement of both Xinjiang’s importance and the Xinjiang party chief. Still, his formal status upgrade to the Politburo has been delayed, in what appears to be a display of Mr Xi’s attempt to bifurcate power between high-ranking officials and the Politburo.
His predecessor, Ma Xingrui, illustrates the other side of this new reality. Under his watch, Xinjiang saw major infrastructure and high-tech investments and efforts to integrate with the Belt and Road Initiative. But his departure was abruptly announced, and he currently holds no known post, despite retaining his Politburo seat.
In effect, Mr Ma is now a senior cadre without a job, an apparent form of soft sidelining. It is in stark contrast with his predecessors who transitioned into defined roles after leaving Xinjiang and evident of a new political reality.
XI’S NEW POLITICAL ORDER
These developments reflect a deeper drift from what began even before the 20th Party Congress.
In 2022, ahead of the congress, the party conducted an unusually broad round of personnel consultations compared to the 19th Congress, soliciting opinions from 283 civilian and theatre command leaders and 35 top military leaders. Mr Xi also personally held one-on-one talks with 30 principals to solicit views.
The result was a smaller, 24-member Politburo (down from 25), a symbolically even number that eliminated the theoretical possibility of a tie-breaking vote and projected a carefully balanced image of unity and consensus across systems and sectors – all loyalists of Mr Xi.
Read the full article here
