If, due to the disqualification of MPs under Article 48, or their disability or death, the prime minister loses his majority in the House before the next general election, the solution should be as provided in Article 43(4) – the prime minister’s resignation, or a request to the monarch for early dissolution.
These will trigger the monarch’s broad discretion to accept or refuse the request for dissolution or to ask the incumbent to stay in a caretaker interim capacity till the monarch succeeds in the appointment of a coalition, unity, or minority government.
The law should draw a clear and rational distinction between “ceasing to be a member” (which results in a vacancy) and being “dismissed” (which does not cause the seat to fall vacant).
The political and financial rewards of defecting must also be taken away, including by preventing a defecting MP, even if re-elected, from holding a Cabinet post or any remunerative post in government, statutory bodies and GLCs during the remaining parliamentary term.
Indeed, Malaysia should emulate India in amending the Constitution to restrict the number of federal ministerial and deputy ministerial posts to no more than 50. Note that almost all state constitutions, including Johor, put a cap on the number of state Cabinet posts. The Federal Constitution should emulate State Constitutions on this point.
In the decades ahead, genuine coalition politics will likely be the norm. Sabah and Sarawak’s political clout will continue to increase, and their restraining role in the Peninsula’s identity politics may become effective.
A resurgent monarchy may also help to provide new directions and moderate extremism. In this milieu, better legal controls over political parties are necessary.
Shad Saleem Faruqi is a Visiting Senior Fellow at ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute, Singapore; and Tunku Abdul Rahman Chair, University of Malaya. This commentary first appeared on ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute’s blog, Fulcrum.
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