China has also been building up its maritime presence in the Pacific. It currently ranks third in the Pacific, behind only the US and Australia, according to Anne-Marie Brady, a specialist in Chinese, Pacific and polar politics at the University of Canterbury in New Zealand.
Last year, it registered 26 China Coast Guard (CCG) vessels to operate within the jurisdiction of the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission. Analysts have said the CCG is often deployed in grey-zone operations in contested waters.
This gives the designated CCG vessels legal authority to board foreign fishing ships operating on the high seas within an expansive area covering nearly 20 per cent of the Earth’s surface. Notably, this area encompasses all three of the island chains.
CCG vessels have frequently been deployed to assert Beijing’s maritime claims in contested areas of the South China Sea, including near Philippine-held features. Their presence has often led to tense standoffs, with Manila accusing them of blocking resupply missions and using water cannons against Filipino boats.
TUSSLE FOR STRATEGIC DOMINANCE
A tussle for strategic dominance underlies the actions by the US and China in the Second Island Chain and overall Pacific, observers say.
China’s push into the Second Island Chain has been deliberate and multi-faceted, particularly in safeguarding what it sees as core national interests, said Ridzwan from Janes.
“China imports 80 per cent of its energy sources via the sea. The land connection that it has with Russia and Pakistan is not enough to keep up with this demand for energy imports,” he said.
“It’s very easy for the Americans to cut off China’s sea lines of communication that are beyond the First Island Chain. So I think that’s the emphasis on the Second Island Chain – to make sure that its sea lines of communication remain open.”
Davis from ASPI believes China isn’t just concerned about protecting its communication channels – it also wants to open up offensive options.
“It’s about laying the groundwork for a future presence that could cut critical sea lines of communication between Australia and the US, as well as those running south of Australia through the Coral Sea up to Japan,” he told CNA.
Against this backdrop, he said the US has ramped up its efforts in Micronesia to maintain control over key sea lines of communication and check China’s expanding Pacific footprint. Davis described the back and forth as a “game of geostrategic wei qi”, referencing the Chinese name for the board game Go.
In Go, players often disperse stones across the board to build influence and flexibility, rather than overcommitting in a concentrated area. Davis said this mirrors the US strategy of spreading forces across the Second Island Chain to reduce vulnerability and maintain operational resilience against a concentrated strike.
At the same time, growing American emphasis on the defence line in the western Pacific is driven by mounting concerns over China’s increasingly sophisticated anti-access and area denial (A2/AD) capabilities, he said.
A2/AD is a military strategy aimed at preventing an adversary from entering or operating freely within a specific region. Tools include long-range missiles, air defences and naval assets, as well as cyber attacks and electronic warfare.
China’s growing wartime capabilities are making it increasingly challenging for the US and its allies to operate effectively or hold ground within the first island chain – China’s immediate maritime buffer – should a conflict break out, Davis said.
“China is extending its counter-intervention capabilities further (beyond its shores) and developing more effective A2/AD capabilities, to the point where the potential cost of deploying within its near seas is becoming too costly,” he said.
“So, the US (wants) to make use of the Second Island Chain – centred on Guam – to project power from, and also to deny China the ability to project power beyond the island chain out into the far seas.”
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