As tensions escalate, the window to avoid spiraling conflict in the Middle East and beyond is narrowing. Concerns that Iran might develop nuclear weapons are unlikely to be resolved by war. Any durable solution must come from treaties, diplomacy and enhanced verification—not force. The legal framework already exists but needs strengthening.
The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) governs the global nuclear order. The next NPT Review Conference convenes at the United Nations in New York later this month, and it’s pivotal.
The NPT rests on a grand bargain: countries without nuclear weapons agree not to develop them in exchange for the five nuclear weapons states in the treaty—U.S., U.K., France, China, and Russia—working in good faith to end the nuclear arms race and achieve nuclear disarmament. NPT’s Article IV explicitly asserts an “inalienable right” of states-parties to research, develop, and use nuclear energy for non-weapons purposes, and the “fullest possible exchange” of information and technology between states with nuclear weapons and those without.
These provisions are binding. Nearly every country on earth, including Iran and the United States, have ratified the NPT as the law of their lands. Only four—Israel, India, Pakistan and North Korea—stand outside it.
During the failed negotiations in Islamabad, the U.S. demanded Iran accept a 20-year moratorium on uranium enrichment for any purposes, including peaceful ones, and export its uranium stockpiles. This contradicts the NPT’s clear guarantee of the right to a peaceful nuclear program.
At the same time, the treaty requires strict legal constraints under the watchful eyes of the International Atomic Energy Agency, to prevent development of fissile materials that could be used in a nuclear weapon. Those constraints can and should be made far more rigorous, and not just for Iran. Instead of singling Iran out, enhanced “safeguards” should be applied universally, so no more states develop nuclear weapons.
Iran’s past conduct raises legitimate concerns. Revelations in the early 2000s of its surreptitious nuclear activities undermined confidence and raised suspicions that its purpose was not peaceful, triggering the crisis still unfolding today. Iran disputes those suspicions, and for reasons of national pride as well as politics and strategic positioning, it is unlikely to fully concede past wrongdoing.
So there are two sets of realities and interests: the concern Iran is racing for a nuclear weapon vs. Iran’s insistence its nuclear program is peaceful. They’re utterly different, but there is a way to bridge them: strengthen the NPT.
Consistent with the treaty’s terms and intent, there could be a more robust, intrusive, anywhere/anytime inspection and verification regime for uranium enrichment. It could be crafted to apply not just to Iran, but equally to all non-nuclear weapon states in the NPT. At the same time, the U.S. could signal its readiness to reinvigorate the disarmament process among nuclear weapons states, which is at the heart of the treaty.
These steps aren’t just theoretical notions. Regarding disarmament, there is plenty of precedent: since the end of the Cold War, nuclear weapons states reduced their arsenals over 80 percent. That’s a significant, underrecognized accomplishment, though it’s currently getting reversed by nuclear arsenal modernization and expansion policies.
Regarding stepping up the inspection regime, there’s a practical model for success in the Chemical Weapons Convention, which permits challenge inspections on an anytime/anywhere basis. A similar mechanism could be implemented for uranium enrichment by a strengthened International Atomic Energy Agency.
Under such a framework, Iran would retain its right to uranium enrichment. In exchange, it would accept the most intrusive inspection regime ever devised—not as punishment but as part of a new, more effective global standard.
This could transform the current crisis into global threat reduction, benefiting all. Iran would not lose face. The U.S. would be recognized as having made the world safer by strengthening the international system and the rule of law.
Expanded war with Iran will not achieve these things. It would increase violence, chaos, and the odds of proliferation. European allies, China, and most of the rest of the world want a solution before the conflict widens.
Law offers a better path than war. The NPT remains the central legal instrument of the nuclear order. The task now is to use it creatively, rigorously, and universally.
The way out of the war is not through domination, but through enhanced verification and respect for the rules that govern us all. As President Reagan said, “Trust but verify.” That path remains open. Seize the day.
Jonathan Granoff is an international lawyer and president of the Global Security Institute. He has worked extensively on nuclear arms control, nonproliferation, and international security policy.
The views expressed in this article are the writers’ own.
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